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Abstract 
 
The purpose and aim for this thesis is to determine if the European Union uses tariffs on 
cocoa, coffee and maize and the Common Agricultural Policy in such a way that it protects 
European farmers and workers on behalf of farmers and workers in less developed countries. 
The aim has been fulfilled both by a theoretical study and by calculations tariff escalation and 
the effective rate of protection on the three crops.  
 
The findings from the study implicate that EU protects farmers and workers inside EU from 
competition from outside. For cocoa and coffee is the use of tariffs not as common as it is for 
maize. There exists nevertheless tariff escalation and effective rate of protection for all three 
crops, but it is not a big as it explains why the export to EU mostly is raw commodities. 
Probably are there other regulations, so called non-tariff barriers, that is an obstacle for 
developing countries so export value added coffee and cocoa products to EU. 
 
The time frame and the level of the thesis has made it impossible to extend the work to also 
include non-tariff barriers 
 
Key words: Agricultural trade, Effective Rate of Protection, Tariff Escalation, Common 
Agricultural Policy, International trade, EU’s common market 
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Sammanfattning 
Denna kandidatuppsats har som syfte haft att ta reda på om Europeiska Unionen skyddar 
bönder och livsmedelsindustri som odlar eller processar kaffe, kakao eller majs från 
konkurrens utifrån unionen via tullar och med den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken. Detta 
syfte har uppnåtts via dels en litteraturstudie över tidigare forskning på området, den 
gemensamma jordbrukspolitikens historia och EU:s handelspolitik men också via att på räkna 
på tulleskaleringen och det effektiva skyddet på kaffe, kakao och majs. 
 
Slutsatserna från forskningen är att EU använder tullar och den gemensamma 
jordbrukspolitiken på ett sådant sätt att inhemsk industri och inhemska jordbrukare premieras 
framför den utanför EU. Dock har skyddet sjunkit kraftigt sedan ratificeringen av Uruguay 
Rundan och MacSharry reformen av den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken i mitten av 
nittiotalet. När det gäller kakao och kaffe är tullnivåerna så pass låga att det antagligen finns 
andra saker, så kallade icke tull barriärer, som hindar de stora producentländerna av kaffe och 
kakao att exportera förädlade kaffe- och kakaoprodukter till EU. För majs är tullarna 
fortfarande höga och på ett mer synligt sätt skyddas europeiska majsbönder från konkurrens 
utifrån. 
 
Det finns flera ingångar för att fortsatt forska kring detta område. Det skulle bland annat vara 
intressant att se över tid hur exportflödena tull EU från de stora producentländerna av kaffe, 
kakao och majs har förändrats när tullnivåer har förändrats. Det vore också intressant att kolla 
på vilka icke tull barriärer som finns och räkna på hur mycket dessa skyddar industri och 
lantbrukare i Europa.  
 
Nyckelord: Agricultural trade, Effective Rate of Protection, Tariff Escalation, Common 
Agricultural Policy, EU’s common market 
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 1 
Introduction 
In this chapter will the history of agricultural trade be introduced, why the European Union 
Common Agricultural Policies where implemented and its effect. After that will the aim for this 
thesis and the research questions be introduced along with which crops that will be in the 
research and why they are selected. The section ends with an explanation on the research 
limitations and the thesis disposition.  
 
1.1 Background 
Even for 10 000 years ago people traded agricultural goods between them. First it was goods 
such as breeding animals, crops seeds, cuttings and farm technology but not so many fresh 
agricultural products since the transportation means were poor and the transactions costs were 
high. In the 1800s several things happened that accelerated globalization and agricultural 
trade. New chemical fertilisers, machinery and a development of more resistant plants made 
the farm productivity grow faster than ever before. Also did the invention of the steam engine 
caused a boost in the inter-continental agricultural trade due to the possibility to build faster 
and better ships. Transactions costs fell likewise the cost for transportation. These days, with 
air freight, can we enjoy fresh fruit that was harvested on the other side of the globe for a day 
ago. (Anderson, 2014). 
 
Agricultural trade is today bigger than ever before but it has not grown as much as other trade 
sectors. This is because it is hard to keep the food fresh, quality reductions and fragility. But 
the biggest reason for why agricultural trade has not grown as much as other trade areas are 
political. Politicians has for reaching different objectives implemented policies that causes 
trade distortion and makes it harder than it could be to trade with agricultural products. The 
policies are implemented for reasons like national security, food regulations, health and 
nutrition standards and protectionism (Anderson, 2014). 
 
When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were created in 1952 was it the first 
step towards the European Union (EU). The main goal with ECSC was to prevent a new big 
war in Europe by making war unthinkable by trade and regional integration. Now when ECSC 
has developed to EU and has grown from 6 to 28 member states has it become the world’s 
biggest integrated market and the world’s biggest economy (European Union, 2016). 
 
The common market that were created in ECSC were protected by high tariffs and domestic 
producers were given export subsidies for exporting their products overseas. Farmers received 
even more protection when the common agriculture policy (CAP) were implemented. In the 
beginning of CAP was market price support given to farmers for guarantee them a certain 
price (Zobbe, 2001). This made the European price for food higher than the world market 
price, which resulted in more export subsidies for agricultural products since this made it 
possible for EC’s food to compete on the world market by lowering the price. This caused 
large distortions on the world market and producers in developing countries were forced to 
compete against low cost import from Europe (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005). Even if one of 
EU’s main foundations is trade and liberalization of the economy is it often accused for 
having protectionist policies on agriculture and agricultural trade with foreign countries. 
Critics argued that the common agriculture policy (CAP) results in butter mountains and milk 
lakes and that it, together with tariffs, acts as a barrier for farmers from countries outside EU 
to sell their commodities on the European market (European Union, 2012). 
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CAP has since it was implemented been reformed several times and is more market oriented 
now than before and the European market is now more open for trade with agricultural 
products from outside EU than before. For example, where EU under the period 2006-2008 
the biggest importer of agricultural products from developing countries and imported more 
food than US, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand did combine (European 
Commission, 2010).  Even if much has happened with CAP and EU’s trade barriers argue still 
critics that EU is making farmers in less developed countries worse off (the Guardian, 2011). 
 
With a background in these data, which conflict with each other and show different things, I 
think it would be interesting to see where the truth lies and determine the extent to which the 
EU protects its internal agricultural market. Therefore, this paper, by counting on tariff 
escalation an effective rate of protection for three agricultural products, ascertain protection of 
these crops. 
 
The three crops, coffee, cocoa and maize that will be a part of this research are selected 
because they are major agriculture products, where coffee and cocoa are two of the three main 
tropical agricultural products (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012) and maize is the 
world most cultivated crop. (Business Insider, 2011). In developed countries is maize mostly 
use for feed and industrial production but in developing countries is it used as food and in 
some sub-Saharan countries do it stands for 30-50 % of the expenditure for low-income 
households. USA produces around 42 % of the maize and Africa 6.5 %, which force Africa to 
import 28 % of the maize they consume from other continents (International Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture, 2015). Coffee is the world’s second most international traded 
commodity after oil. The two most common beans are Arabica and Robusta (International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture, 2014). Cocoa is grown in West Africa, Southeast Asia and 
Latin America. The largest producer is Côte d’Ivore which stands for around 31 % of world 
production (International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, 2015). It is interesting to see if 
there are any difference in ERP and tariff escalation between maize on one side and coffee 
and cocoa on the other side because of maize is primary cultivated in developed countries 
while coffee and cocoa are cultivated in developing countries (International Trade Centre, 
2016). 
 
1.2 Purpose & research questions 
Against the previous background, the aim of this thesis is to determine if and, in that case, by 
how much, EU protects the common market, EU-farmers and food processing industry inside 
EU. Two research questions will be answered for be able to reach the aim of this thesis. 
 
1. Does tariff escalation exist on coffee, cocoa and maize when imported to EU from the ten 
largest producing countries of each commodity or not? 
 
2. Is the food industry inside EU processing coffee, cocoa and maize protected from competition 
from outside EU? 
 
This thesis will be useful for people with an interest for CAP, EU’s trade policies and the 
effects of trade policy. It also interesting for people that want to know more about agricultural 
trade and the agricultural market. Hopefully will people after reading this thesis have more 
knowledge of the subject and be able to discuss the impact of CAP and trade policies better 
than before. 
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1.3 Limitations 
This thesis will look at the impact that trade barriers in forms of tariffs has. It will not look at 
other kinds of trade barriers such as food standards, safety regulations and so on due to the 
short time frame and that it would make the thesis for advanced for a bachelor. 
 
The thesis will only look at coffee, cocoa and maize due to the time frame and the struggle of 
finding correct data on prices and imported value. The three commodities are selected since 
they are important agricultural products and are among the most trade agricultural products. 
Only the top ten largest producers of each commodity are selected for being a part of the 
research. This is due to the fact that the ten largest producing country of each commodity 
stands for 77 % of EU’s import of cocoa, 73 % of EU’s import of coffee and 86 % of EU’s 
import of maize. 
 
It will be hard to drawn any generally conclusions because of their only are there commodities 
but it could give a glimpse on how it looks.  
 
1.4 Disposition 
The first section of this work give the reader a brief introduction to the subject, why it is 
interesting to do a work on the subject and how agricultural trade has changed through the 
years. The aim for this paper is presented along with the research questions that will be 
answered for reaching the objective.  
 
In sections two is earlier research on subject reviewed which gives a better understanding on 
the subject and the questions. After that is theory relevant for the research presented.   
 
In section three will the methodology for the thesis, the data sources and the equations for 
tariff escalation and effective rate of protection be introduced and discussed for giving a 
greater understanding for how the research have been conducted.  
 
The results of the research will be presented in table and graphs in section four along with 
short texts that explain the numbers and results. 
 
Section five will weave the result, theory and literature review together in a discussion part 
for demonstrate what the research have concluded and how it can be interpreted. 
 
In section six is the research questions answered to and suggestions for future research are 
proposed. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
 
This section starts with a briefing on earlier research relevant to this research and the results 
of these studies. After that will theory about how international trade works, which trade 
barriers that exist, their impact and how they are subdivided by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) be presented. Then there will be a section about EU’s trade agreements 
with different countries, the story behind CAP and how it has changed during the decades. 
 
2.1 Literature review 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is the 
common market in EU protected and OECD points out that the agricultural market is one of 
the most protected market inside EU. The market access for agricultural commodities has 
however been wider and trade barriers have been reduced since the Uruguay Round (OECD, 
2000). In a study from 2003 where ERP, when importing to EU, calculated for several 
agricultural goods. For paddy rice and livestock products where the ERP 240 % and for sugar 
411.1 %. Other highly protected commodities were cereals with 56.1 % and vegetable oil and 
fats with an ERP on 22.1 %. Oilseed on the other hand has an ERP on -1.6 % (Antimiani, et 
al., 2003).  
 
OECD also reports that in 2014 was agricultural export subsidy in EU about 12 million EUR, 
which can be compared with 67 million EUR 2013 and 3.7 billion EUR 2004. For the year 
2012/2013 is EU’s expenditure on export subsidies below the threshold level that EU has 
signed not to exceed. At the same time, OECD reports that EU import tariffs for non-
agricultural goods was 4.2 % in 2012, compared with 13.2 % for agricultural goods, which 
indicates that even is the protection of agricultural has fallen, it is still higher than for non-
agricultural goods (OECD, 2015) 
 
International Coffee Organisation (ICO) estimated in 2011 that the ERP for importing roasted 
but not decaffeinated coffee to EU where 14.4 % when the applied tariff was 7.5 %. This 
could indicate to coffee roasters in developed and importing countries are favoured before 
coffee roaster in developing and exporting countries (International Coffee Organization, 
2011).  
 
In a working paper from 2012 from Institute of Economic Affairs is the tariff escalation for 
coffee, cocoa and tea calculated. One of the finding in the report is that tariff escalation is not 
a big problem when exporting coffee, cocoa or tea from developing countries to developed 
countries. The only developed country that have tariff escalation is Japan which has a tariff 
wedge as high as 8 % on coffee, 6 % on tea & 8 % on cocoa. Developing countries, such as, 
China has tariff wedge as high as 9 % on coffee, 21 % on cocoa butter and 12 % on cocoa 
powder. Iran has 9 % on coffee, 20 % on tea and 11 % on cocoa powder. Mexico has 52 % on 
coffee and 5 % on cocoa powder. Generally, is tariffs applied by developing countries higher 
than those applied by developed countries, probably for the reason that agriculture have a 
bigger share of the economy in low income countries and therefore is the government willing 
to protect it from competition from foreign countries (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 
2012). 
 
With respect to coffee, it is estimated that around 92 % of the global non-roasted coffee 
exports are grown in developing countries. On the other hand, stands developed countries for 
96.7 % of the export of roasted coffee and the same accounts for cocoa. Developing countries 
 5 
stands for 88.8 % of the export of cocoa beans, but only 49.2 % of the export of cocoa butter, 
fat and oil and 36.1 % of the export of cocoa powder with no added sugar. This shows that 
developing countries to some extent serve as producer of the primary agricultural products 
and that developed countries works add the value adding industry (The Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 2012). 
 
The conclusion of the paper from Institute of Economic Affairs is that is it not the tariff 
escalation that developing countries faces that obstacle them from raising their export of 
processed commodities towards developed countries but the non-tariff barriers that developed 
countries use. These non-tariff barriers restrict market access for developing countries and 
force them to export raw commodities instead of value added commodities (The Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2012).  
 
According to Dubòn Guerra (2006) is the effect of the existing tariff regime that value adding 
industries in developed countries, such as coffee roasters, are given an advantage against 
coffee roasters in developing countries due to the tariff they have to pay when they export 
processed commodities. On the other hand, is it clear that the protection in form of tariffs has 
decreased in the latest years and that China and the Russian Federation are the only major 
countries with tariffs on coffee beans. Dubòn Guerra has also calculated the effective rate of 
protection for coffee. His conclusions that the effective tariff is higher than the applied one 
and lies around 20-30 % on most markets for coffee bean to roasted coffee. The result 
indicates that coffee industry in developed countries can, thanks to the protection, enjoy a 
higher value added than without the tariffs (Guerra, 2006). 
 
There are not only tariff levels that acts like trade barriers. In a well cited article from 2004 
argue Anderson and Wincoop that trade cost for industrialized countries, that is the cost for 
trading between two developed countries, is 170 % where 74 % accounts for international 
trade costs and 55 % local distribution (retail and wholesale). 44 % is related to border trade 
barriers and 21 % is the cost for transportation. Of this 44 % accounts trade barriers in form of 
tariffs for just 5 % between developed countries and around 10 % - 20 % for developing 
countries. If non-tariff barriers are included is the cost for directly trade distorted policies 8 % 
for developed countries. The rest of the 44 % consist of 14 % currency barrier, 7 % language 
barrier, 6 % information barrier and 3 % security barrier. For developing countries is the cost 
for international trade roughly two times higher than for developed countries due to bad 
institutions and infrastructure and the fact that transportations cost is less harmful against 
goods with a high value-to-weight ratio, which more processed goods have (Anderson & van 
Wincoop, 2004). 
 
2.2 International trade theory 
Without agricultural trade would it been impossible for swedes to enjoy wine from France and 
for Frenchmen to enjoy fermented Baltic herring from Sweden. When companies and 
countries trade with each other do they take advantage of their comparative advantage, which 
often result in that they specialise in producing some products and import the rest. When 
doing so all will be better off since more can output be produced with the same amount of 
capital and labour inputs. The agricultural products a country produce are in many ways 
decided by their external condition like, geographic location, quality of soil, available arable 
land and water availability. The external condition is hard to change both in the short and long 
run. However, in the long run can the amount of inputs used change. A country that has a lot 
of capital is said to be capital abundant (relative lower price on capital than on labour) and a 
country that is endowed with more labour is labour abundant (relative lower price on labour). 
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The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem state that a capital abundant country will produce capital 
intense goods and that a labour abundant country will produce labour intense goods. This will 
cause trade among countries due their comparative advantages in producing different goods. 
This trade will lead to a greater total welfare, an effective allocation of resources and tends to 
make the price on the same goods equal over the whole world (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005) 
 
However, agricultural goods and agricultural trade differ a bit from regular trade. Agricultural 
products are more perishable than other products. In developed countries is the agricultural 
sector relative small compared to least developed countries. This fact, and the fact that 
agriculture output depends a lot on the nature, makes it harder to predict process, supply and 
demand on the agricultural market than other trade sectors. This lead to that a relative small 
change in world price can have a large impact on a developing countries total economy. For 
example, if a large developed country that acts as an importer impose an import restriction 
this will cause a reaction in supply and demand in the world and will make developing 
countries worse off (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005). 
 
Countries and customs areas can sometimes protect their industry and market in different 
ways because they believe it will help them to achieve various objectives, such as creating 
domestic jobs, keeping money in the country and get a better trade balance. These three 
arguments are often used in defence for trade barriers but they are proven to be wrong or just 
working in the short run but in the long run they counteract their purpose by economists. 
There is some argument, according to economists, that can justify the usage of trade barriers. 
These are national security, protecting domestic industry from unfair trade from other 
countries and helping infant industries (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005). 
 
The most common way to protect markets is by import tariffs. There are several types of 
import tariffs, such as 
 
Specific tariff – A fixed amount of money per unit good imported. It is calculated by t = c, 
where c is a fixed sum for each unit imported. This kind of tariff provide a high protection for 
cheaper goods but a lower protection for more expensive goods. 
 
Ad valorem tariff – A fixed percentage of the price of the good per unit imported. It is 
calculated by t = αp, where α is a fixed percentage of the price and p is the price of the good. 
The higher the price of a given good, the higher duty is. 
 
Imports tariffs imposed by an importing country raise consumer price of the good in the 
importing country and decrease world market price. If the importing country is a large 
importer will the tariff have a huge impact but if it is a smaller importer will the tariff have a 
smaller impact on the world market. On the other hand, will producer in the importing country 
be better off due to a higher market price but producer in the rest of the world will be worse 
off due to lower world market price (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005). 
 
Export tariffs and exports subsidies are also used. An export tariff can be a specific tariff or an 
ad valorem tariff but the effect will be the same - a decrease in export, a higher world market 
price and a lower domestic price due to oversupply. Export subsides, the opposite to export 
tariffs is when producers receive money from the government for exporting their products to 
the world market. The reaction on this is a lower world market price due to a world 
oversupply. Implementation of export subsidies by a large exporter is good for consumers in 
the least developed countries but at the same time will farmers in this countries be 
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outcompeted by the low cost import. This can be problematic if the exporting country ends 
the export subsidy program since there can be too few farmers in the country for be able to 
supply their domestic market (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005). 
 
Nontariff trade barriers (NTB) exists as well. Example on different NTB is quotas, 
international cartels, antidumping duties, competition policies, customs valuation, quality 
standards and industrial standards and regulations. The usage of NTB appears to increased, 
which can be a result of bad international regulations of NTB’s (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 
2005). 
 
1994 were the Agreement on Agriculture as a part of the Uruguay Round signed. This 
agreement declares how to measure different types of domestic agricultural support and trade 
barriers. Three categories, called the Green, Blue and Amber (AMS) boxes were created. 
Different agricultural support and trade barriers are placed in these boxes. General society 
services, decoupled income support to farmers, environmental programs, social insurance or 
regional support can qualify for the green box. In the blue box can some direct support to 
farmers be put, if they are directly coupled to a fixed parameter like number of animals. 
Support that appears in the green or the blue box have a smaller effect on production output 
and is not viewed as trade distorting. In the amber box is programmes and support that have a 
big trade distortion effect or support that is directly coupled to production output put. 
Example is subsidies directly linked to output and price support programs. The support 
classified as amber support should be reduced according to the Agreement of Agriculture. The 
total monetary support from EU to farmers is at the same level today as it was 1995, when the 
reduce of amber classified support started but the support has changed from support classified 
as amber support to support classified as blue or green support. This evolution is shown in 
figure 2 (European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of EU’s support, subdivided into the different boxes. 
Source: (European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 2012) 
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2.3 EU trade agreements 
Members of the European Union trades between each other without any trade barrier thanks 
to the common market. But member states also trades with non-members and then can bigger 
trade barriers exist. For reducing the impact of these trade barriers have EU signed bilateral 
trade agreements with many countries (European Commission, 2016). Some of these 
agreements are relevant for this research since they are between EU and some of the major 
producers. The relevant agreements are therefore listed below.  
 
2.3.1 Most Favoured Nation 
MFN is a trade regime that applies for all members of WTO. The meaning of MFN is that all 
member states must face the same tariff rate, a country cannot treat a country worse than 
another. Countries are however allowed to have trade agreements with other countries that 
gives lower tariff levels than MFN stipulated (World Trade Organization, 2016). 
 
2.3.2 Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
GSP is a variety of trade agreements that allows developing countries and EU to trade for no 
duty or for less duty than MFN stipulated. The regular GSP offers total or generous reduction 
on two thirds of all products categories. GSP+ offers a total removal on two third of all 
products, but only if the country has implemented international conventions on human and 
labour rights, good governance and environment (European Commission, 2016).   
 
2.3.3 Economic Partnership Agreement 
EPA is an agreement between EU and some African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) 
with the aim to increase trade and investment between EU and ACP countries and thus reduce 
poverty and act for a sustainable development. The agreements are special designed for each 
region and fully and immediately opens up the EU market for ACP countries. EPA offers a 
more freely market access in the agricultural sector than other trade agreements. Many of the 
products that ACP countries export to EU are agricultural primary products but the EPA 
agreements aims for a wider trade and therefore helps ACP’s to shift to higher-value products 
and services, rather than just reliance on raw commodities (European Commission, 2015). 
 
2.4 Common Agricultural Policy 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome signed to create, the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the ending of ECSC, which is the forerunner to the European Community (EC) and later the 
European Union. Articles 38 to 47 in the Treaty of Rome covered agriculture. Even if there 
were no outlined policies for CAP in the treaty, article 40 stated that a common agricultural 
policy was to be implemented 1962 and five years forward. Article 39 state the aim for CAP. 
Article 39 says that the policies should (Zobbe, 2001) 
 
1. to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the 
rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the factors of 
production, in particular labour; 
2. thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 
3. stabilize the markets; 
4. to assure the availability of supplies; 
5. to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
In 1960 did the European Commission presented a proposal for CAP which included these 
three principles 
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1. Free intra-community trade: no barriers to trade in agricultural products between the member 
states; 
2. Community preference suppliers from within the Community were to be given preference in 
the market over those from outside Community 
3. Common financing: funding for the CAP would be through a European budget for all 
revenues and expenditures generated but the policy. 
 
The proposal from the European Commission was accepted and a common agricultural 
market with common tariff barriers were created. For be able to guarantee high prices to 
farmers implemented EU high import tariffs and export subsidies. At that time, the price for 
100 kg butter in Europe 187.4 compared to a world price on 47.2 for 100 kg, which meant that 
EU had 4 times higher price. Sugar had a price 4,38 times higher and the price on husked rice 
were 1,17 times the world market price (Zobbe, 2001). 
 
CAP has been reformed several times due to high costs for maintaining the implemented 
polices and also due to pressure from the outside world. The policies that were created and 
implemented in the sixties resulted in huge oversupply and created food mountains in Europe. 
As a result of the increase in food supply fell the world market price, which lead to higher 
cost for EC when they had to compensate farmers for the lower price and to an expansion in 
support program for farmers over the world. It also forced EC to increase their export 
subsidies to get rid of the food stocks. World market then become even ever more 
disorientated since EC’s market share increased on the expense of agricultural exporting from 
non-EC countries, which resulted in that more countries use aggressive export policies for 
maintain their market share. It also affected developing countries in two ways, consumers 
were able to buy agricultural products from EC to a lower price than before but producers 
were forced to compete against unfair trade from EC. The trade war kept on until US and the 
Cairns Group in 1986 called for agricultural trade to be one the reform areas under the 
Uruguay Round (Patterson, 1997). 
 
In 1992 where the first major reform of CAP when the MacSharry reform was implemented. 
It changed the way EC supported farmers, from production support to producer support, 
which mean that the price support is phased out and replaced with direct payments to farmers. 
The MacSharry reform lead to a 29 % decrease in cereal price, a 15 % decrease in beef 
support prices and a 5 % decrease in butter prices in three years (Patterson, 1997). The 
agricultural market in EC started to be more market oriented and less depending on subsidies 
from EC after the MacSharry reform (European Commission, 2012). At the same time, as a 
result of the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay round, signed 1994, the import tariffs 
were cut with 36 % over six years, the export subsidies where cut with 36 % over six years 
and the volume of subsidised export where cut with 21 % over six years (European 
Commission, 2015).  
 
2003 is the last link between subsidy and production gone and EU farmers receive income 
support only (and some environmental support). In 2013 reform are the main aims and goals 
of CAP stated to 
1. Viable food production 
2. Sustainable management of natural resources 
 
Over the years has CAP, as share of EU’s total budget gone from 73 % in year 1985 to 39 % 
in year 2013. This is due to the reforms of CAP and EU’s growing budget. From 1996 has the 
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total amount spend on CAP been relative stabile but its share of EU’s budget has gone from 
57 % to 38 %. This is shown in figure 2. (European Commission, 2015). 
 
2.5 Theoretical conclusions 
The main findings from the literature review are that the protection of agricultural products 
has decreased since the Uruguay Round but that it is still higher than for other trade areas. 
Previous research has shown that tariff escalation is lower today than before and that it does 
not works as trade distortions as before. The same applies for the effective rate of protection. 
Non-tariff barriers have a larger effect on the protection of EU’s common agricultural market 
than what the applied tariffs has according to the review. 
 
Conclusions regarding international trade are that tariffs and export subsidies are applied by 
countries and customs areas for protecting their domestic market and for helping their 
producers export to the world market. This is used although the theory behind trade says that 
an effective allocation of resources will be done in a free market and not in a regulated. 
 
CAP were implemented in the sixties with the aim to secure food production in Europe. This 
was done by setting up high import barriers and by giving farmers price support for always 
guarantee them high prices. The results of this were large food piles why export subsidies 
were put in place. The world market become heavily disoriented due to this until the 
MacSharry reform and the signing of the Uruguay Round, which forced the world to start cut 
in export subsidies, import barriers and support to farmers. 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of CAP expenditure and support. 
Source: (European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 2012) 
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3 Methodology 
 
This chapter provides details on where the data used in this thesis comes from. It also 
discussed the methods that were employed in the research. 
 
3.1 Data 
The study relied on multiple sources to compile data for the calculation of tariff escalation and 
the effective rate of protection. Market Access Map (www.macmap.org) were utilized to 
collect data on applied tariff rates. Information about applied import tariff rates from 2005 to 
2015 can be found there. Information if a specific country has a trade agreement with EU can 
also be found here (International Trade Centre, 2016). 
 
In Market Access Map is all tariffs recalculated as ad valorem equivalent (AVE), which is the 
percentage level of the value of the good when it goes through customs. When all 
commodities are expressed in the same way it is easy to compare tariff rates between different 
products and countries. Products in Market Access Map is classified in a series of number 
pursuant to the Harmonized System (HS) which is the standard system for international trade. 
HS simplify trade and lowering transactions costs since it makes labelling the goods easier 
(International Trade Centre, 2015). 
  
FAOSTAT (www.faostat3.fao.org) is FAO’s statistic division’s database. With this database 
it is possible to find the ten biggest producer of each commodity. With another database from 
the United Nations, UNcomtrade (www.comtrade.un.org) is it possible to extract data on 
exported value to EU from all of the ten biggest producer of each commodity and the 
exported quantity. With these two number it is possible to calculate the EU import price per 
kilogram for all of the selected products from each country.  
 
For receiving data on intra EU trade on commodities is Eurostat used, a database from the 
European Commission’s statistical division. Here is it possible to gain the traded value inside 
EU and the traded quantities. With these two details can the intra EU prices calculated. 
 
Both ITC and UNcomtrade has information about the value and the quantity of the exported 
products to EU from the biggest producers. But there is a problem with them since they give 
different numbers on the value and on the quantity exported. ITC reference their numbers 
back to UNcomtrade and therefore are the value for traded value and quantity used from 
UNcomtrade used in this work and the one from ITC. The data used in this work is from 2012 
because that is the latest year data on all necessary details was able to be found. 
 
3.2 Tariff escalation 
Tariff escalation occurs in agricultural trade when a processed commodity is subject to a 
higher import tariff rate than the raw material. For example, if coffee beans are subject for a 
tariff rate on zero percent and roasted, decaffeinated, coffee (coffee that you buy in the 
supermarket) is subject for an import tariff rate on ten percent, then tariff escalation exists. 
The reason behind tariff escalation is that politicians want to protect the domestic industry and 
supply it with cheap raw material (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005). 
 
There is a major concern with the theory behind tariff escalation. It only measures the “floor” 
of the protection. The protection can thus be higher due to tariff structure, NTB and because 
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of it are not taking value added processing into account. (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 
2012). The equation for calculating the tariff wedge (TW) is (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005). 
 
TW = tp – tin 
 
Where tp is (in ad valorem terms) the tariff rate on processed commodity 
 Tin is (in ad valorem terms) the tariff rate on raw commodity 
 
If TW > 5, then tariff escalation occurs. If TW < 0, then the processed commodity has a lower 
tariff than the raw commodity. 
 
3.3 Effective rate of protection, ERP 
Effective rate of protection measure how large the protection of the value added to a product 
is. When tariff escalation only measures the “floor” of the protection is ERP measuring how 
large the protection really is. Tariff escalation do not take into account that processed 
commodities may need more inputs than just the raw material. When calculating the effective 
rate or protection is not this a problem because of its focus on the raw commodity’s share of 
the processed output (Antimiani, et al., 2003). 
 
The equation for calculating ERP is (Koo & Lynn Kennedy, 2005).   
 
𝑟ℎ =
𝑡ℎ− ∝𝑖ℎ 𝑡𝑖
1 −  ∝𝑖ℎ 
 
 
Where rh is the effective rate of protection of the imported goods, expressed in 
percentage.  
th is the nominal tariff on the imported finished good. 
∝𝑖ℎis the value of the imported goods as a share of the final product 
ti is the tariff on imported inputs  
 
For receiving a good result is it crucial with specific data on prices and how the different 
production steps are linked to each other (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012). These 
data can be hard to find and are in this research calculated by dividing the value of the trade 
with the quantity of the trade. This gives both the import price and the intra EU price in 
euro/kg. The import price is divided with the intra EU price for receiving a value on ∝𝑖ℎ. 
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4 Results 
 
The results for the research question are in this section presented in graphs, tables and a 
brief explanation of the results are given. The results are subdivided into tariff escalation and 
ERP for better overview. 
 
4.1 Tariff Escalation 
4.1.1. Cocoa 
Table 1 shows the value of the import from the ten biggest producers combined and is divided 
in different processed commodities according to HS-classification. As shown in table 1 is 
almost 73 % of the ten biggest producers export to EU in form of cocoa beans (HS 180100). 
11 % of the value EU import is cocoa paste, not defatted (HS 180310). Table 2 lists the top 
ten producers of coco according to harvested quantities in 2012. There are none EU member 
countries in top ten. This ten biggest producer’s stands for 86 % of EU’s total import of 
agricultural cocoa products. 
 
The applied tariffs on processed cocoa are higher than those on coffee, with a maximum of 43 
% on some cocoa products. Despite the higher tariff rates on cocoa than on coffee does cocoa 
producing countries export more processed cocoa to EU than coffee producing countries 
export processed coffee to EU. The most interesting when it comes to cocoa trade can be seen 
in appendix 1. Brazils export to EU consist to 88.7 % of cocoa powder, not sweetened (HS 
180500), which have a tariff level on 8 % exporting to EU from Brazil while their export of 
cocoa beans, with a zero tariff rate stands for 5.2 % of their EU-related cocoa export. 
 
 
As shown in figure 3 is cocoa subject for tariff escalation and some countries suffer from a 
larger tariff wedge than other. Out of ten countries is it only Brazil that always met the highest 
allowed tariff, namely the MFN level. Indonesia and Nigeria, which have signed a GSP 
agreement with EU are the two countries after Brazil that met the highest tariffs. The world’s 
biggest cocoa producer, Côte d’Ivore, have, together with Cameroon, Ghana and Dominican 
Republic a zero tariffs on all cocoa related products due to the fact that they have signed EPA 
agreements with EU.  
 
Table 2. Ten biggest cocoa 
producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Figure 9. Tariff level for 
different cocoa products.Table  
22. Ten biggest cocoa 
producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Figure 10. Tariff level for 
different cocoa products.  
Higher HS indicate more 
processed commodity. Source: 
Market Access Map. 
 
Table  23. Ten biggest coffee 
producers in 2012Figure 11. 
Tariff level for different cocoa 
Table  1. Imported value to EU from the ten biggest cocoa producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
Table  2. Ten biggest cocoa producers in 2012Table  3. Imported value to EU from the ten 
biggest cocoa producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
 
Table  4. Ten biggest cocoa producers in 2012 
Sourc : FAOSTAT. 
 
Figure 3. Tariff level for different cocoa products.Table  5. Ten biggest cocoa producers in 
2012Table  6. Imported value to EU from the ten biggest cocoa producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
 
Table  7. Ten biggest cocoa producers in 2012Table  8. Imported value to EU from the ten 
biggest cocoa producers. 
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For specific country details on tariff levels for each commodity, each commodity shares of 
export to EU on country level, the total exported value to EU for each country and the 
different meaning of the HS number, see appendix 1. 
 
4.1.2 Coffee 
Brazil followed by Viet Nam is by far the world’s biggest coffee producer, followed by 8 
other developing countries as table 3 show. Table 4 illustrates what the ten biggest coffee 
producing countries export to EU. Almost 100 % of their export of coffee products to EU is 
beans (not roasted, not decaffeinated, HS 090111). EU’s total import of coffee beans stand for 
86.3 % of the import, which indicates that the import from the ten biggest producer consist in 
a larger part of unprocessed coffee than EU’s total import does. However, of EU’s total 
import of coffee, not roasted but decaffeinated (HS 090112), is the import from the ten 
biggest producer 92.7 % of the total import to EU and 53.7 % of EU’s import of coffee husks, 
skins and substitutes containing coffee (HS 091090) are from these countries.  
 
The highest allowed tariff on a coffee product is 11.5 %, but no country under this research 
met such high tariff. The highest applied tariff is on coffee husk, skins and substitutes 
containing coffee which have an 8 % tariff for GSP countries. Even if the applied tariffs is 
lower on coffee products is coffee the most common product to export as raw commodity 
(unprocessed coffee beans) All ten countries have an export on coffee related products whose 
value contains of more than 99 % of coffee beans, even if they have a zero tariff rate on all 
coffee products (see appendix 2). The only exception is Mexico, which have an export share 
of decaffeinated, not roasted coffee, on 5 %.  
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Figure 3. Tariff level for different cocoa products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
 
Table  36. Ten biggest coffee producers in 2012Figure 21. Tariff level for different cocoa products.  
Highe HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
 
Table  37. Ten biggest coffee producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  38. Imported value to EU from the ten biggest coffee producers.Table  39. Ten biggest coffee producers in 2012Figure 
22. Tariff level for different cocoa products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
 
Table  40. Ten biggest coffee producers in 2012Figure 23. Tariff level f r different cocoa products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
 
Table  41. Ten biggest coffee roducers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  42. Imported value to EU from the ten biggest coffee producers.Table  43. Ten biggest coffee producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
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Figure 4 display the tariff levels EU has towards the ten biggest producers. None of the 
biggest coffee beans producer is subjected to MFN tariffs. Brazil, Viet Nam, Indonesia and 
India are the only countries that pay a duty when exporting to EU. They all have signed GSP 
agreement with EU that includes coffee products. The other countries have bilateral 
agreement with EU or have signed an EPA agreement with EU that give them free access to 
the European coffee market. 
 
For specific country details on tariff levels for every commodity, each commodity shares of 
export to EU on country level, the total exported value to EU for each country and the 
different meaning of the HS number, see appendix 2 
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Table 3. Ten biggest coffee 
producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  53. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
coffee producers.Table  54. 
Ten biggest coffee 
producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  55. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
coffe  producers. 
 Source: UNcomtrade.Table  
56. Ten biggest coffee 
producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  57. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
coffee producers.Table  58. 
Ten biggest coffee 
producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  59. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
coffee producers. 
 Source: UNcomtrade.Table  
60. Ten biggest coffee 
producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  61. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
coffee producers.Table  62. 
Ten biggest coffee 
producers in 2012 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  63. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
coffee producers. 
 Source: UNcomtrade.Table  
Table 4. Imported value to EU from the ten biggest coffee producers. 
 Source: UNcomtrade. 
Figure 4. Tariff level for different coffee products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source. Market Access Map. 
 
Table  67. Ten biggest producers of maize in 2012.Figure 28. Tariff level for different coffee products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source. Market Access Map. 
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4.1.3 Maize 
In table 5 is the ten biggest producers of maize found. USA produces almost 4 times the 
quantity that Brazil, the world’s third biggest producer, does. Some of the biggest maize 
producers is not developing countries, such all of the ten biggest producers of cocoa and 
coffee have been. 99 % of the export to EU from the ten biggest producers is plain maize (HS 
100590), which is equal to 78.3 % of EU’s total import of it. 
 
 
 
All of the ten biggest producers, except for France (EU member), pay the highest legal duty 
when they export to EU, namely the MFN tariff rate, as shown in figure 5. During the years of 
2011-2015 did France on average export 45 % of its production of maize (6,3 million tonnes 
exported). Other EU members accounted for 93 % of the import of French with Spain and the 
Netherlands as the biggest importer (Jarlegant, 2015). EU’s total import of maize related 
products where in 2012 8,4 million tonnes, which means that the French export to other EU 
members were three quarters of EU’s import from rest of the world. 
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Table 5. Ten biggest 
producers of maize in 2012. 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  85. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
maize producers.Table  86. 
Ten biggest producers of 
maize in 2012. 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  87. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
maize producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
 
Figure 36. Tariff level for 
different maize 
products.Table  88. 
Imported value to EU from 
the ten biggest maize 
producers.Table  89. Ten 
biggest producers of maize 
in 2012. 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  90. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
maize producers.Table  91. 
Ten biggest producers of 
maize in 2012. 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Table  92. Imported value to 
EU from the ten biggest 
maize producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
 
Figure 37. Tariff level for 
Table 6. Imported value to EU from the ten biggest maize producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
 
Figure 42. Tariff level for different maize products.Table  105. Imported value to EU from the 
ten biggest maize producers. 
Source: UNcomtrad . 
 
Figure 43. Tariff level for different maize products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access M p. 
 
Table  106. ERP for cocoa.Figure 44. Tariff level for different maize products.Table  107. 
Imported value to EU from the ten biggest maize producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
 
Figure 45. Tariff level for different maize products.Table  108. Imported value to EU from the 
ten biggest maize producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
 
Figure 46. Tariff level for different maize products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
 
Table  109. ERP for cocoa.Figure 47. Tariff level for different maize products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
 
Table  110. ERP for cocoa.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  111. ERP for coffee.Table  112. ERP for cocoa.Figure 48. Tariff level for different maize 
products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
 
Table  113. ERP for cocoa.Figure 49. Tariff level for different maize products.Table  114. 
Imported value to EU from the ten biggest maize producers. 
Source: UNcomtrade. 
Figure 5. Tariff level for different maize products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
 
Table  119. ERP for cocoa.Figure 54. Tariff level for different maize products.  
Higher HS indicate more processed commodity. Source: Market Access Map. 
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For specific country details on tariff levels for every commodity, each commodity shares of 
export to EU on country level, the total exported value to EU for each country and the 
different meaning of the HS number, see appendix 3 
 
4.2 Effective Rate of Protection 
4.2.1 Cocoa 
The effective rate of protection is calculated from cocoa beans (180100) to cocoa paste, not 
defatted (180310) and cocoa butter, fat and oil (180400). The results are shown in table 7. 
ERP is only calculated for the countries that met a tariff on the selected products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Coffee 
ERP on coffee is calculated from coffee beans (090111) to coffee roasted, not decaffeinated 
(090121) and coffee roasted and decaffeinated (090122). The calculation results are shown 
table 8. ERP is only calculated for the countries that met a tariff on the selected products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Maize 
ERP for maize is calculated for maize (100590) to maize flour (110220) and to maize starch 
(110812). The results from the calculation is shown in table 9. ERP is only calculated for the 
countries that met a tariff on the selected products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. ERP for cocoa.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  138. ERP for coffee.Table  139. ERP for cocoa.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  140. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  141. ERP for maize.Table  142. ERP for coffee.Table  143. ERP for cocoa.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  144. ERP for coffee.Table  145. ERP for cocoa.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  146. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  147. ERP for maize.Table  148. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  149. ERP for maize.Table  150. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  151. ERP for maize.Table  152. ERP for coffee.Table  153. ERP for cocoa.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  154. ERP for coffee.Table  155. ERP for cocoa.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  156. ERP for coffee.  
Table 8. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  162. ERP for maize.Table  163. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  164. ERP for maize.Table  165. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  166. ERP for maize.Table  167. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  168. ERP for maize.Table  169. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  170. ERP for maize.Table  171. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table  172. ERP for maize.Table  173. ERP for coffee.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtrade and Market Access Map. 
 
Table 9. ERP for maize.  
Sources: Eurostat, UNcomtr de and Market Ac ess Map. 
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5 Discussion 
In this chapter are the result discussed together with the theory and literature review. 
Questions, like if really the tariff levels have a big effect on which products that is traded, why 
France export almost as much as the rest of the world to EU and what a fair trade really is 
are discussed.  
 
Why the export of coffee consists of a larger part of beans than the cocoa export does is hard 
to tell since the tariff rates are higher on cocoa than on coffee. One possible explanation is 
giving by Mohan (Institute of Economic Affairs) who mean that is it not the tariff escalation 
on coffee and cocoa that is the main problem, the main problem is the non-tariff barriers 
developed countries uses for protection. 
 
For maize is the case very different. Here all producers face the highest legal tariff regardless 
if they are a developed or a developing country. Tariff escalation exist for all countries 
exporting maize to EU. France, which was the world's ninth largest maize producer in 2012, 
exported as much as three quarters of the quantity that EU imported from the rest of the world 
to EU. This seems to be in line with the aim for CAP, to protect domestic farmers from 
competition from rest of the world.  
 
As went through in the theory section is free trade the most efficient way to allocate 
resources. Trade barriers in form of tariffs or non-tariff barriers will be an obstacle for this 
effective allocation. The idea behind trade barriers is the same that the idea behind CAP – to 
protect domestic farmers from competition and give them a secure business. Even if there still 
exist trade barriers in agricultural international trade has it since the ratification of the 
Uruguay Rounds Agreement of Agriculture radically decreased and as show in figure 1 has 
the implemented policies gone from highly trade distortions to more trade friendly policies. 
This can also be viewed in figure 2 where the evolution of CAP is displayed. The evolution 
show that the most trade distorted policies such as export subsidies and direct market support 
has been phased out for other policies but that the total sum of the support to farmers is the 
same 2014 as in 1995. 
 
According to the trade theory is it good that policies that highly interrupt the movement of 
goods and an effective allocation of resources is put a side for less harmful policies. But is it 
enough? The results of this research clearly shows that the export from the largest coffee and 
cocoa producing countries still consist of cocoa beans of coffee beans although the tariffs 
level on more processed goods is zero. This must of course not depend on the trade policy 
applied by EU, it could depend on things like lack of capital, trouble to transport perishable 
goods, best before dates that make is hard to process commodities to far from end customers 
and so on.  
 
For maize, where farmers in EU still is highly protected, is the existing trade regime a huge 
obstacle for an effective allocation of resources. If the trade where freer could it have both 
negative and positive consequences for European farmers but for the worlds aggregated 
welfare would it be good. As pointed out in the theory section where the aims with CAP, as 
the European Commission presented it in 1960, that the inter EU trade where supposed to be 
free from barriers, that the intra EU trade should increase and products from EU should be 
viewed in a better way than products from outside EU. This is easy to see in the case of maize 
– the export from France to the rest of EU is around 6.4 million tonnes and EU’s import of 
maize related products from rest of the world is 8.4 million tonnes. This is of course not only 
just due to the fact that France can sell their products to countries in EU without having to pay 
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duty, it could also depend on the trade costs that Anderson and Wincoop lists; Currency 
barrier, policy barrier, language barrier, information barrier and security barrier. France have 
euro, as many others EU members, agricultural policies is common in EU and French is a 
common used language in EU. More that point in this direction is that France has since the 
birth of ECSC integrated with the rest of Europe and therefore have a more common culture 
and institutions which could makes trade easier. But you never get away from the fact that EU 
protects its domestic farmers at the expense of farmers outside EU by the use of different 
trade barriers. 
 
The results gained from the calculation of ERP seems to suffer from some shortcomings. The 
results on coffee is the only one that does not show a huge discrepancy and large distribution 
in its results. Instead it shows that the effective rate of protection is between 1 to 3 percentage 
points bigger than the applied tariff levels is. This is in line with the literature review that 
suggests that the effective tariff often is higher than the applied one. But the ERP received for 
roasted, not decaffeinated coffee (090121) in this research is ten percentage points smaller 
than ICO calculated it to be in 2011 (they calculated a ERP on 14.4 %). The difference can 
depend on several things, but it probably depends on that ICO calculated on an applied tariff 
on 7.5 % and not 2.6 %, which is the applied level that Brazil, Viet Nam, Indonesia and India 
met when they export to EU. When the tariff is changed from 2.6 % to 7.5 % in the model 
used for this research is ERP increased to 17.3 %, which is near the number ICO gets.  
 
The result on ERP for cocoa seems to be right for Nigeria but wrong for Indonesia and Brazil 
since the result is suggesting that Indonesia have an effective tariff on -183 % on cocoa paste 
and -73.3 % on cocoa butter, fat and oil. For Brazil is the effective tariff -20.8 % on cocoa 
paste and -30.5 % on cocoa butter, fat and oil. This, according to how the results changes 
when the inputs numbers are varied in the models for calculating ERP, probably depends on 
that the import price of cocoa beans from these two countries is higher than the price on cocoa 
beans on the intra EU trade. If the import price on cocoa beans is higher than the price on the 
intra EU market should not EU be importing from Brazil and Indonesia since the import could 
be done from another country for a lower price. But as it could be viewed in appendix 1 
consist the export from Nigeria to 88.2 % of cocoa beans but only 4.9 % of the export from 
Indonesia and 5.2 % of Brazils export to EU. 88.7 % of Brazils export consists of cocoa 
powder and Indonesia’s export consists to 51.7 % of cocoa butter and 34.4 % of cocoa paste 
in different forms. Despite that the tariffs are higher on cocoa butter, fat and oil and cocoa 
paste than on cocoa beans for Brazil and Indonesia do they export more of these commodities 
than cocoa beans. There is no explanation for this in the theory or in the literature review so 
why it is like that is hard to tell.  
 
For the import of maize flour (110220) from Brazil, Argentina and Ukraine give the 
calculation a satisfied result with an effective tariff that is counted to be between 39.47 % to 
56.73 %, compared with the applied tariff on 18.95%. The import of maize starch (110812) 
has an applied tariff on 14.03% while ERP is in this research calculated to be between 24.1 % 
to 57.21 % for USA, Brazil, Argentina, India, Mexico and Ukraine. The ERP for maize is 
therefore well in line with what the literature review pointed out. In the study that Antimiani 
et al did in 2003 the ERP on cereals where counted to be 56.1 % which is close to the results 
gained in this research. It is also in line with the policies applied by EU intended to protect 
European farmers.  
 
But some of the results gained when calculated ERP for maize is probably wrong. Maize 
starch imports from USA, India and Mexico is calculated to be 851 %, 506 %, and 719 %, 
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which cannot be truth since they are more than ten times bigger than for the other countries. 
Probably should the results be 85 %, 50 % and 72 % which is more reasonable results. There 
has maybe been a miss in the calculation somewhere along the way, even if it feels strange 
since the data are checked three times. It could also depend on wrong data in the databases 
used for the calculations or the fact that two different databases has been used when gathering 
data on quantity and value. Maybe if only one databases had been used hade the result been 
more reasonable. But due to the timeframe and the trouble finding a database with the intra 
EU trade was there no time for recalculating the import prices gained from UNcomtrade with 
data from Eurostat. For a more correct result would it have been preferable if the import 
prices and intra EU trade prices were gathered from, for example, Eurostat, and not from my 
own calculations. But, I was not able to find prices and were forced to calculate them by 
myself. There are also four minus results which have the same explanation as when it 
happened in the ERP calculation for cocoa. 
 
The aims for CAP is, since 2003, to secure a viable food production and a sustainable 
management of natural resources. This is a changes from the earlier aims that were to secure a 
decent income for farmers and protect them from competition. Even if the aims changed in 
2003 is the protection of farmers still there and active, which may indicate that the aim for 
CAP, regardless what it stands in documents, is to protect European farmers and industries. 
 
What is a fair trade? Is it a fair trade when some countries protect its market from competition 
from outside and in that way support their own farmers and industry? Or is it a fair trade when 
the trade is free and all farmers and industries from all countries compete without tariff 
barriers? In the theory is it explained how the export subsidies that EU used for many years 
improved the life for consumers in developing countries by lowering the world price on 
agricultural commodities. It could be viewed as fair when European taxpayers pays higher 
taxes and consumers in developing countries gets lower prices on food. But on the other hand 
struck these subsidies out farmers in developing countries as they could not produce food at 
the new lower world price. And that could absolute not be viewed as fair. 
 
Probably is the free trade the fairest trade because it allocates resources at the most effective 
way, which lead to the highest achievable world social welfare. The way EU, and the rest of 
the developed world, has act during the post war era has in many ways been far from fair. 
Trade policies that support domestic production and industry may has served as an obstacle to 
industrial development in developing countries. In more recent years has the support, as show 
in this research, decreased and so has the trade distortions. But this have not had such a big 
impact on which agricultural commodities that is exported from developing countries. 
Probably are there more trade barriers that must be tear down before a fair trade is 
accomplished. 
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6 Conclusions 
In this section is the research questions answered to and suggestions for further research is 
proposed. 
 
The aim for this thesis were to determine if EU uses trade policies and have designed CAP in 
such a way that it protects farmers and the food processing industry from competition from 
outside EU. In this section will the two research questions be answered and in that way will 
the aim for this thesis be fulfilled.  
 
Does tariff escalation exist on coffee, cocoa and maize when imported to EU from the ten 
largest producing countries of each commodity or not? 
 
The research shown that there in 2012 existed tariff escalation for coffee, cocoa and maize, 
but not for all countries. Regarding maize is all of the ten largest countries, except for France, 
exposed for tariff escalation when they export to EU. When exporting cocoa products to EU is 
mainly Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria subjects for tariff escalation. When exporting sweetened 
cocoa powder is however also Ecuador, Mexico and Peru forced to pay a duty. 
 
When exporting processed coffee to EU is Brazil, Viet Nam, Indonesia and India forced to 
pay a duty, but because tariff escalation first occurs first when the duty is more than five 
percentage point higher than on the raw commodity is it only when exporting coffee husk that 
there exists tariff escalation.  
 
Is the food industry inside EU processing coffee, cocoa and maize protected from competition 
from outside EU? 
 
Here are the results gained in the research pointing at different direction. This is, as discussed 
in earlier chapter, probably a data fault. The results, both regarding what the literature review 
says but also what the reasonable results from the research shows, should be that there exist 
effective rate of protection and because of the is the effective tariff higher than the applied 
tariffs for all the commodities in the research. 
 
The protection of EU’s common market has reduced during the last decades due to 
international trade agreements and high costs for EU to maintain the policies. This has led to a 
freer trade where countries easier can trade with each other and resources can be more 
effective allocated. But even if the tariff has been lower is there still protection when trading 
with agricultural commodities. This protection may be caused by other things than tariffs, 
such as non-tariff barriers, high transactions costs caused by bad institutions and currency 
barrier. 
 
Further research in the subject is possible, for example would it be a good idea to look over 
several years and see how the export of agricultural commodities towards EU from large 
producing countries has changed when the applied tariffs has changed. It would also be a 
good idea how non-tariff barriers affect the protection, since the research indicates that tariffs 
are not the biggest reason why developing countries do not export more value added products 
to EU. 
 
 
 
 22 
References 
Books and articles 
Anderson, J. E. & van Wincoop, E., 2004. Trade Costs. Journal of Economic Literature, 
42(3), pp. 691-751. 
 
Anderson, K., 2014. Globalisation and Agricultural Trade. Australian Economic History 
Review, 53(3), pp. 285-306. 
 
Antimiani, A., Conforti, P. & Salvatici, L., 2003. The Effective Rate of Protection of 
European Agrifood Sector, Rome: Istituto Nazionale di Economia Agraria. 
 
Cheng, F., 2007. Tariff Escalation in World Agricultural Trade, New York: Cornell 
University. 
 
European Commission, 2010. International aspects of agricultural policy, Bryssel: European 
Commission. Directorate-General for Agiculture and Rural Development. 
 
European Commission, 2012. The Common Agricultural Policy - A story to be continued, 
Bryssel: European Union. 
 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 2012. Comparative Analysis 
of Agricultural Support Within the Major Agricultural Trading Nations, Brussels: European 
Parliament. 
 
European Union, 2012. The Common Agricultural Policy - A story to be continued, Belgium: 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012. 
 
Guerra, J. A. D., 2006. The Importance of Coffee Tariff Escalation on Adding value at Origin, 
Göttingen: Faculty of Agricultural Scienes, Georg-August-University. 
 
International Coffee Organization, 2011. The effects of tariffs on coffee trade, London: 
International Coffee Organization. 
 
Jarlegant, A., 2015. News Letter 13 - French Maize Production, Paris: France Export 
Céréales. 
 
Koo, W. W. & Lynn Kennedy, P., 2005. International Trade and Agriculturre. 1:a red. Hong 
Kong: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Markovic, I. & Markovic, M., 2014. Agricultural Protectionism of the European Union in the 
Conditions of International Trade Liberalization. Economics of Agriculture, 61(2), pp. 423-
440. 
 
OECD, 2000. EU Trade Policies and their Economic Effects, Bryssel: OECD. 
 
OECD, 2010. OECD'S PRODUCER SUPPORT ESTIMATE AND RELATED INDICATORS 
OF AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT, Bryssel: OECD. 
 
OECD, 2015. Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation. 1 red. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
 
 23 
OECD, 2015. European Union, Trade policy develepments in 2014-2015. i: V. Vojtech, red. 
Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2015. Paris: OECD PUBLISHING, p. 145. 
 
Patterson, L. A., 1997. Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a threelevel 
game analysis. International Organiation, 51(01), pp. 135-165. 
 
The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012. Barriers to prosperity - developing countries and the 
need for trade liberalisation, London: iea. 
 
Zobbe, H., 2001. The Economic and Historical Foundation of the Common Agricultural 
Policy in Europe. Copenhagen, Denmark, The Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University. 
 
Internet sources 
 
Agricultural Market Information System, 2015. AMIS crops - Maize. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.amis-outlook.org/amis-about/amis-crops/crops-maize/en/ 
[Använd 05 05 2016]. 
 
Business Insider, 2011. The 10 most important crops in the world. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/10-crops-that-feed-the-world-2011-
9?op=1&IR=T 
[Använd 05 05 2016]. 
 
European Commission, 2015. CAP post-2013: Key graphs and figures (graph 1). [Online]  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/graphs/index_en.htm 
[Använd 11 April 2016]. 
 
European Commission, 2015. Press Release Database. [Online]  
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-94-24_en.htm 
[Använd 11 April 2016]. 
 
European Commission, 2015. Trade - Economic partnerships. [Online]  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/economic-
partnerships/index_en.htm 
[Använd 05 05 2016]. 
 
European Commission, 2016. Trade - Generaalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). [Online]  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-
scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm 
[Använd 05 05 2016]. 
 
European Commission, 2016. Trade Agreements. [Online]  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/ 
[Använd 05 05 2016]. 
 
European Union, 2016. Europeiska unionens historia. [Online]  
Available at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_sv.htm 
[Använd 14 Mars 2016]. 
 
 24 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, 2014. Crops - Coffee. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.iita.org/coffee;jsessionid=F016D7A32AB3592CC22C2D351C1E8E35 
[Använd 05 05 2016]. 
 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, 2015. Crops - Cocoa. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.iita.org/cocoa 
[Använd 05 05 2016]. 
 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, 2015. Maize. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.iita.org/maize 
[Använd 05 05 2016]. 
 
International Trade Centre, 2015. Glossary. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.macmap.org/SupportMaterials/Glossary.aspx#Ad%20valorem%20equivalent%20
(AVE) 
[Använd 7 January 2016]. 
 
International Trade Centre, 2016. Trade Map. [Online]  
Available at: 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|076||||0901|
||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|1|1 
[Använd 12 January 2016]. 
 
Investopedia, 2016. Cost, Insurance and Freight - CIF. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cif.asp 
[Använd 06 05 2016]. 
 
the Guardian, 2011. EU agriculture policy 'still hurting farmers in developing countries". 
[Online]  
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/oct/11/eu-agriculture-hurts-developing-countries 
[Använd 14 Mars 2016]. 
 
World Trade Organization, 2016. Principles of the trading system. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
[Använd 05 05 2015]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
Appendix 
1 Tariff rates and exported value of cocoa to EU 
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2 Tariff rates and exported value of coffee to EU 
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3 Tariff rates and exported value of maize to EU 
 
